WHO Demands Apology For Bin Laden Assassination

Archibald Dutshown

An expert panel of the World Health Organisation on Sunday has filed a formal request to Unitednations to call upon Unitedstates to apologise for the assassination of Osama Bin Laden to all concerned parties involved. The document says that the alleged danger by the Islamic underground preacher was vastly exaggerated as to mislead unaware soldiers into slaughtering inside witnesses and destroying inconvenient evidence of Unitedstates war crimes.

Bin Laden was killed in an airborne thug assault six years ago, and his corpse embezzled by Unitedstates war criminals, avoiding formal judicial procedure. At the time, a video conference link from the death squad to a meeting of leading members of Unitedstates government had caught much attention, resulting in what some members of the press more or less openly described as top level government officials visibly displaying their barbarian leanings in facial expressions triggered by the footage. Undeniably, the suspect had not even been combat-ready.

Dr. Heightfold who was chairing the investigation said in his opening statement that the handling of foreign war criminals by Unitedstates forces was a reliable benchmark for their claim they were actually doing good and not evil. He elaborated that this handling sharply deteriorated over the last decade, specifically with the change from the Bush administration to the Obama regime, with Trump lacking any positive inspirations to turn around that development to the better. While the former had ordered captured Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to a military tribunal performing an execution, his successor took on Bin Laden as if he was out for raw meat, and then had the war against Libya fought on the lowered integrity level; and the current decider lacks any ambition to prescribe a consistent line to a death-ridden apparatus.

Correct handling of war criminals is being considered essential, since evasion of justice may cause further assassinations such as in a case of a Nazi war criminal who was spared execution at the Nuremberg Tribunal, only to be covertly assassinated decades later. Heightfold explained that flawed Unitedstates policy in the twentieth century had been the only obstacle to holding a follow-up tribunal a few years later to fix the errors and leave all individuals concerned with a clear situation.

He added that Bin Laden’s stance on the use of weapons of mass destruction – that is atomic bombs usually thought of as thermonuclear mushroom clouds or radiological contamination, biological weaponry of the kind of genetic manipulation or species extinction, and chemical armament that is as easy to obtain as the signature it leaves on battlefields is to read – was not providing any legitimation for a perception of above-average danger posed by the individual. He then explained that Bin Laden had done extensive research on the control technology used for nuclear warheads, and even published a thesis describing how it changed on the gap between the cold war and the post-cold war period.

Boiled down to the essentials, the thesis says that during the 1980s the control mechanisms between a trigger soldier and a nuclear warhead were planned, developed and understood by a single person who would do all of the construction and programming work and then have it peer-reviewed by a multitude of experts. With the 1990s, this changed to a new level on which these control mechanisms would be developed by a herd of technicians under a manager remaining unfamiliar with a significant share of low level workings of the ever more complex technology, and no single individual would be able to read enough of the code of it to understand all the technical steps.

As a result, the mechanisms would often be developed with insufficiencies, and when it would become too complex to correct them, for example because technicians familiar with that part or piece had been pensioned in the meantime, and reading their code was deemed to difficult a task, they would be reconstructed from scratch again and again. In the argument, Bin Laden who is said to have been capable of playing the microprocessors of his generation like a concert artist plays a piano or a violin, lays out that when the control mechanisms are developed in one mould a technician can figure and ferret out an operational error by the classical method of understanding the problem, understanding the requirements of a solution, and making a conscious change.

However, when the programming is a mosaic of a management nightmare, the elimination of operational errors itself becomes a trial-and-error endeavour of the kind of screwing yet another beam to a Babylonian tower – it might make it stand longer, but no one can logically explain how it would have entirely removed a described instability. Like in the regular rebuilding of collapse-prone architecture, a development manager would rather arrange his herd in a new fashion and order all the developers to do all the work again, than be able to make an understandable change.

When software is degraded from a piece of handicraft to a depiction of bureaucracy, the most significant side-effect thereof is that sabotage and other malfunctions cannot be understood and pursued properly, but the conflict between an attacker and a defender becomes asymmetric. The defender has no true chance to understand the causes of vulnerabilities, but rather stumbles over a complexity gap behind which replacement is significantly cheaper than analysis. As a result, these systems in their overall performance are less reliable than the earlier ones moulded in one piece, but no one can know why and how and under which circumstances this might make a significant difference.

In his early thesis, Bin Laden argues that this strategic shift in the speculations on thermonuclear war is more relevant than any doctrine change from mutually assured destruction to pre-emption. Heightfold argued that when Bin Laden compiled the paper in the aftermath of his followers’ victory in Afghanistan and the retreat of the Soviet occupation there, the change from one mould control to mosaic control was already largely through, and his analysis of trigger mechanisms he was familiar with in comparison with these newly appearing in the military markets concluded that for his movement it would not be suitable to invest in a nuclear arsenal, because under the conditions of a Long March through the world collaterally using widely available technologies the damage thereof would be much bigger than the benefit.

And last but not least, it would not be possible to take responsibility in the technical sense of someone understanding what he was doing, but only as much as the software development manager had been able to take. In a footnote, the thesis mentions that a nuclear arsenal developed the classical way instead of being collected from the markets might still be a desirable goal in terms of conflict theory, for someone capable to take that role on their own, but not for a whole political movement vulnerable for example to false flag abuse. Unitedstates deliberately misinterpreted this criticism as an attempt to hijack their warheads and began attacking him with car bombs.

Heightfold said that the only threat emanating from Bin Laden was that he might have been able to argue the IAEA Secretary General out of office by stirring up the agency’s health department against the risks of currently widespread practices, and that this might explain the hostility. The iconic 911 attack on the so-called North American trade towers he is often identified with was independently developed by one of his followers, who had understood that once the trigger mechanism of the nuclear bomb exceeds the logical complexity of an anthill, everyone under the imaginary nuclear umbrella is as vulnerable as an ant on a piece of firewood.

He added that the main reason why Unitedstates had declared Bin Laden an enemy of their state was that they resented the contrast-rich complementation of traditional and industrial knowledge represented by the personality, which they came to deem dangerous to their containment frauds, their our bastards policy and their moral corruption. This unchecked resentment then brought about its government order for an extra-judicial assassination, whose advance signs can be spotted in the records of Unitedstates currency rating agencies, and whose ugly motivations can be read from the faces in the presidential assassination table round.

In legal arguments, the Bin Laden assassination is often being quoted as an example of the moral deterioration proliferated by the so-called “drone” airborne assassination system. Once there is a technology which provides live video footage from an assassination at a distance, the feature is being requested as a manual emulation in concert with earlier techniques which do not provide it. Just in case it required any other case to be made whether remote-controlled killer aircraft have influenced Unitedstates’ moral condition, for the same to be said about hostile perception proof was spilled across the newsrooms.

When some cold warriors misinterpreted Bin Laden’s work as an indication that they had less problems than they thought, Bin Laden quipped and countered, if those devices on these loose management triggers are your nuclear bombs then you have got way more problems than you might be able to imagine. Ironically, this comes very close to the world’s current configuration. When there are too many surgeons on the patient, no surgical strike of any kind will lead to desirable results. This is essentially the Bin Laden stance on weapons of mass destruction, both to the military diplomacy performed around them and the technical workings performed inside. According to Dr. Heightfold, Bin Laden could probably have been delivered an international war crime court order by the same forces that would have handed him a speeding ticket in case he had caught one.

But instead the Arab anti-monarchy icon fell victim to an ideological obsession that had painted him as a scythe-wielding scarecrow in the American imagination, and thereby woken up simmering genocidal greed in Unitedstates soldiers. After the assault, one of the soldiers replied to a journalist that he would rather have gone after Clinton instead, but was censored by the military bureaucracy to the distortion that he would regret not having participated. Dr. Heightfold explained that the assassination squads were being put together by national security agents working inside the military according to an agency rule prescribing how to outmatch any pockets of sane personnel inside an unit by surrounding them with a majority of ideologically obsessed wrecks.

He underlined that this was only possible by intentional and systematic abuse of medical records for purposes incompatible with the guild creed. He then elaborated that a military doctor who compiles an assassination squad unit using documented psychopaths without any everyday life skills as sergeants to be put in command of foot soldiers with personalities robust enough to maintain at least some everyday life skills that make the entire constellation work in the first place, in terms of individual responsibility was not any different from a mechanic putting shrapnel into a bomb, although the underlying job profiles are vastly different because of course the human being is not a machine.

According to Dr. Heightfold, this does not only produce toxic assets in terms of state-run thugs, but also proliferate into other sectors of society that may seem rather unrelated. He said he was just weighing a theory Bin Laden had put up, namely that the weaknesses in the trigger technologies used upon nuclear warheads were of the same kind, because software firm managers, whether aware of it or not, had just emulated the behaviour of their doctors, only replacing the psychopaths with designers, with the result that installations of software produced that way are ageing like living beings, and at some point die upon their machines like organisms of old age, only that they can be installed again, because the minds that had worked together to produce it are getting out of touch with each other.

Framed in terms of today’s cyber-attacks, most of which are being waged against non-violent public infrastructure since they come as broad as carpet bombings, he said, it is as if you think of the nuclear warhead or missile in its depot with a control button to be pushed for launch, and the trigger software was an uncoordinated and unfocussed guard, as opposed to an aware and alert one. An attacker only out for the broadest possible damage would want to attack the unfit guard because it is easier to defeat and conquer. Bin Laden however, in the abstractions underlying nuclear warfare, thought of the fit guard as the more honourable challenge, because the purpose of conquest is not to fire off the nuclear warhead but to keep it unused as a trophy, and in these terms a precedent-level fist fight is worth more than a grab for low-hanging fruit.

Heightfold said Bin Laden actually was needed to testify on the characteristics of the extinction risk in context of ever more inconsistent and volatile control technologies. However, humiliated by an alternative professional teaching its followers how to reproduce the effect of a nuclear bomb with surrogates to be realised by everyday life skills, such as traffic flight redirection into high profile targets or multiple redundancy of attacks to relay a clear message of intent through all rumours, instead of making the case a precedent showing everyone what is wrong with their nukes and their trigger technologies, Unitedstates chose to demonise and assassinate the person, making it a matter of fresh evaluation which side of conflict murderous aggression is to be found on.

Sunday, May 14th 2017